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This essay is addressed to those concerned with the application 
of linguistic models or analogies to paintings.1 It contends that 
linguistic models are applicable to the analysis of styles of painting. 
Accordingly, it rejects the view of those who oppose the use of a 
linguistic model or analogy for the analysis of paintings. However, 
rather than to apply the linguistic model directly to paintings as such, I 
propose the examination of styles of painting as language-like 
systems. The main task of the paper is to analyze and show the limits 
of certain obstacles to application of a linguistic model or analogy to 
paintings. By showing that certain obstacles posed by Hofstadter and 
Langer are insufficiently supported, I will attempt to clear the way for 
a viable application of the linguistic model to paintings.  
 
There is interest in the question of painting as language on the 
part of artists, art historians, and some philosophers. The discussions 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 32, No. 3 (Spring 1974): pg. 331-342. DOI. This article is © Wiley and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
2 
 
by painters stress the importance of finding the rules or laws of 
"picture language." Poussin, in the seventeenth century; Seurat, in the 
nineteenth century; and Kandinsky, Mondrian, and others in the 
twentieth century have approached the question of the language of 
painting through compositional factors.2 Representative of these is 
Kandinsky's Concerning the Spiritual in Art, an essay in "pictorial 
grammar." The grammar is in terms of form and color based on 
analogies with music and language.  
 
These discussions of "the language of painting" by painters 
suffer from certain difficulties. They try to develop a language for all 
paintings. My own investigation suggests that the search for a 
universal language-like system for all paintings tries to cover too wide 
a range. The resulting system would be open to objection for its 
endless multiplicity of rules and elements and for its failure to take 
account of the diversity found among style groupings. Also, the 
discussions of painting as language by artists do not distinguish clearly 
between syntactic and semantic aspects of painting.  
 
Certain art historians have shown interest in the notion of 
painting as language. Wölfflin introduces two sets of polar categories: 
linear and painterly, plane and recession, closed and open form, 
multiplicity and unity, and absolute clarity versus relative clarity of the 
subject.3 The first of each of these pairs together form a set of criteria 
for Classical (Renaissance) style. The second of the pairs together 
comprise a set of criteria for anti-Classical style. Wölfflin views each of 
these as the basis of two distinct systems of visual representation 
which are like two languages. Shapiro also alludes to the notion of 
styles being like languages consisting of expressive systems.4 
Ackerman attributes to styles language-like features such as 
vocabulary and syntax.5 However, none of these art historians develop 
the notion of painting as language beyond general suggestions that 
paintings are language-like.  
 
Philosophers too have given attention to the question of painting 
as language. Charles Morris in his application of the theory of signs to 
aesthetics argues that the semiotic terms syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics are applicable to paintings.6 However, Morris does not go 
on to show in what sense paintings have these features.  
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Briefly, I hold that within the limits of analogy a linguistic model 
is applicable to styles of painting.7 If styles are the "languages" of 
painting, we must attempt to demarcate the notion of a style. This 
cannot be done by forcing the linguistic analogy too closely. Instead, it 
must be done by working out independent criteria for distinguishing 
one style from another. Thus the linguistic model is not taken over 
literally in terms of words, sentences, subjects, predicates, etc. 
Rather, the analogy serves to elucidate the grammar-like elements 
and rules of the languages of styles. Furthermore, the "grammar" of a 
style of painting is a normative grammar which tells how the elements 
of paintings in the style are to be arranged and used. Its rules may be 
broken without resulting necessarily in a "nonpainting" (as a broken 
rule of syntax may result in a "non-sentence"). Rather, the result of 
breaking an important rule of a "language" of style is a painting which 
either fails to be representative of that style, or is recognizably 
incorrect in that style.  
 
What are the elements of such a grammar of style? By analogy 
to language these are the concepts of syntactic (formal) and semantic 
(referential or representational) aspects of works in a style. Syntax is 
the notion of formal arrangement of the pictorial-visual elements, 
particularly shapes, according to rule but in terms of non-semantic 
considerations. Semantics is concerned with the relations of paintings 
or their shapes in a style to the objects, events, etc., which they 
represent or exemplify. Both function through their respective ways of 
manipulating the pictorial-visual-elements-line, color, value, texture, 
and especially shape. A shape in the broadest sense is any bounded 
area on the picture plane which is defined by linear boundaries; or by 
differences in color, value, texture, or by any combination of these. 
Shapes function in both syntactic and semantic roles in this analysis. 
On the level of syntactic analysis shapes are the primitive elements 
out of which the more complex units (paintings) are constructed. In 
semantic analysis, these shapes may be assigned representational or 
other semantic functions. But as syntactic elements they do not yet 
have semantic import.  
 
In order to sustain the application of a linguistic model or 
analogy to painting, it is necessary to examine objections to this use of 
a linguistic model. The obstacles that I will consider arise very clearly 
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in the writings of Hofstadter8 and Langer.9 Hofstadter's and Langer's 
objections are analyzed as the major opposition because they are 
representative, well formulated, and deal directly with crucial syntactic 
and semantic issues. Their arguments also reflect some of the 
important misconceptions which this essay seeks to clarify concerning 
the analysis of paintings in terms of a linguistic model. One of these is 
the contention that semiotic or significance theories, those which 
approach styles of paintings as sign schema, reduce either the 
meaning (Hofstadter) or the function (Langer) of paintings to 
referential meaning or function. In each case, the referential emphasis 
is said to miss or neglect what is central in the meaning and function 
of paintings. The other chief obstacle is the contention that paintings 
belong to another kind of schema than those to which semiotic 
concepts apply. Langer contends that the two kinds of schema differ in 
their manner of presenting information and that paintings lack 
vocabulary and syntax. Both are essential features of schema to which 
semiotic analysis applies.  
 
I shall contend that the arguments offered in support of these 
proposed obstacles fail to sustain the notion that a linguistic model or 
analogy is inapplicable to paintings. 
 
A. Hofstadter's Objections 
 
I understand Hofstadter's main objection to be that significance 
theories fail to do justice to the meanings of paintings because they 
regard meaning as being "referential." In his comments on Beardsley's 
analysis of significance theories of art,10 Hofstadter suggests that 
Beardsley's choice of significance to deal with the meaning of works of 
art reduces artistic meaning to "the abstract idea of referring." This is 
objectionable to Hofstadter because it reduces artistic meaning to what 
is common to it and non-artistic meaning, which is tantamount to 
having left the art out of the meaning.11 Hofstadter's own view 
incorporates the notion that artistic meaning includes the articulation 
of "a concrete spiritual attitude-containing elements of feeling, 
cognition, and conation."12  
 
There are really two arguments in Hofstadter's objection, which 
can be dealt with separately: 1) that significance theories reduce 
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artistic meaning to mere reference; 2) that significance theories will 
see in a painting only what it has in common with non-artistic 
meaning. The weight of Hofstadter's first argument is based upon the 
questionable assumption that reference in these theories exhausts the 
"meaning" of a painting. What is overlooked in his view is that a 
referential analysis of meaning in a painting does not immediately 
preclude manifestations of artistic or aesthetic significance for the 
same painting. For Hofstadter to substantiate his claim that 
significance theories reduce artistic meaning to reference he would 
have to show that the analysis in terms of one-reference-necessarily 
excludes the other-artistic, aesthetic-as non-referential features. Or he 
would need to show that for significance theories the artistic or 
aesthetic is understood in terms of reference. Hofstadter has not 
shown that either of these situations exists.  
 
Aside from the fact that referential or representational 
"meanings" do not necessarily exhaust the analysis of a painting's 
meaning, I doubt that there is anything in Hofstadter's notion of 
artistic meaning-described as "concrete spiritual attitude containing 
elements of feeling, cognition, and conation"-which differs 
substantially from acceptable denotata of the term representation. For 
representation when applied to paintings is used not only to designate 
references to nature in the objective world but includes references to 
thoughts and emotions. This extension of reference in art is noted in 
the remarks of an earlier writer on the philosophy of art:  
 
As thoughts and emotions cannot be heard or seen in 
themselves, they cannot be presented or communicated to our 
fellow citizens directly.... They must be represented indirectly; 
i.e., through the use of a medium differing from themselves in 
that it can be heard and seen. This medium the mind must find 
in material nature, the sounds and sights of which it can accept, 
imitate, modify and develop...13 
 
There seems to be nothing in Hofstadter's first argument which 
is not covered either by the counter-assertion that representation in 
the narrower sense is only one aspect of the meaning of the painting, 
or by extending representation to include, as it rightly does in 
paintings, reference to concepts and to feelings as well as to nature in 
the external world. Either of the above two equally feasible approaches 
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would render Hofstadter's argument ineffective as a viable support for 
his objection to a significance theory analysis of paintings. Neither 
alternative is incongruous with the analysis of styles of painting as 
language-like systems.  
 
Hofstadter's second argument is that significance theories have 
the unfortunate consequence of causing one to see in a painting only 
what it has in common with non-artistic meaning. Contrary to 
Hofstadter, I suggest that the representational analysis of meaning in 
significance theories does not abandon discrimination among 
references made by a noun, a statement in theoretical physics, and a 
painting. Between references executed in languages and those in 
paintings there are important differences of purpose and of means.  
 
A representation in a language through the use of a noun is 
often used simply to designate or to classify. A reference in the form of 
a statement in theoretical physics functioning as part of a description 
accommodates the needs of an operational model for accounting for 
the orderly behavior of some natural phenomena. However, a 
representation in a painting is hardly ever used simply to designate, to 
classify, or to present scientific description, but rather, it selects, 
emphasizes, arranges, and presents its subject for aesthetic attention 
and enjoyment. While all of these-the noun, the scientific statement, 
and the painting-are engaged in the common task of referring to 
something beyond themselves, there is not the absence of 
discrimination and the reduction of artistic meaning to the abstract 
idea of referring as proposed by Hofstadter.  
 
Between references made in languages and in paintings there 
are also important differences of means. Although inscriptions in 
languages exhibit pictorial qualities such as color, line, value, and 
texture, these pictorial qualities are rarely the means of representation 
for the languages. The syntax of a language ordinarily contains no 
instructions for uses of the pictorial properties. By contrast, the syntax 
of a style of painting does indicate how color and line are to function in 
the style. And on the semantic level, line and color, together with the 
other pictorial elements, comprise the shapes which are the dominant 
vehicles of representation in paintings. Accordingly, hue, saturation, 
thickness of line, and other properties of color important in a painting 
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have not the same bearing on syntactic and semantic functions of 
written languages.  
 
This is not to overlook the fact that color and other pictorial 
elements may affect responses to language elements in certain special 
instances. For example, experimental studies show that the time of 
response to a color word blue is altered when it is printed in red ink.14 
Other possible exceptions are gimmick printing, calligraphy, and 
lettering or typography used to represent in a painting sense by 
characteristics of shape, line, or color. However, in these instances the 
written language is affected by or viewed from the point of view of 
syntactic and semantic rules more like that of painting than of 
discursive written language.  
 
Thus, we see that endowing special cases of linguistic signs with 
pictorial elements does not contradict the assertion that color 
functioning in a style performs in quite a different way in a language 
scheme. For syntactic and semantic purposes a sentence reads just as 
well in one color as another or with thin or thick lines, as long as there 
remains sufficient contrast to discern the words and their order. But in 
the case of paintings, pictorial elements such as color and line, 
operating through the pictorial scheme, are a part of the vehicle of 
representation. Hue, saturation, brightness in color, thickness, 
direction, and movement of lines make up the vocabulary of shapes 
through which the painting refers to something beyond itself. In a 
painting, reference depends upon the visual elements acting in their 
assigned roles in a style.15  
 
The outcome of this discussion of reference in painting and in 
languages is that Hofstadter's conclusion that significance theories, 
when applied to works of art, result in the reducing of artistic meaning 
to what it shares with non-artistic representation is unwarranted. 
Differences in purposes and means in the types of linguistic references 
cited and representation in painting, as noted above, prevent 
Hofstadter's contention from materializing.  
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B. Langer's Objections  
 
Langer's objections to the analysis of styles of painting as 
language-like systems, first, similar to the argument of Hofstadter, 
purport to show that preoccupation with the referential function of 
paintings leads to neglect of their more basic function which is the 
"formulation of experience," and, second, argue that there exist two 
radically different kinds of schema, discursive and presentational, 
which unalterably separate written languages (discursive) and 
paintings (presentational).  
 
1. Representation  
 
Langer's dissatisfaction with the application of representation to 
painting is apparent in her book, Problems of Art. Semanticists' 
preoccupation with reference as a defining property of symbols, she 
charges, has led to a neglect of the more primitive role of formulating 
experience "as something imaginable in the first place." This neglect 
causes some to attribute mistakenly referential function to art symbols 
as well as to others. Langer proposes that art symbols are symbols 
only in a special sense which enables them to perform the formulative 
but not the referential function. Paintings make only direct 
presentations of experience. As expressive forms, paintings present 
the form of a feeling in their structures, but they do not denote by 
pointing to something beyond their presence. They express the form of 
a feeling by presenting "the fabric of sensibility, emotion, and the 
strains of more concentrated cerebrations, for our impersonal 
cognition."16  
 
I suggest, contrary to Langer, that the formulative and the 
referential functions in a painting are not mutually exclusive. A 
painting may do both. There is a distinction between the act of 
formulating and the end product of formulation. The act of formulating 
as illustrated in the making of a painting is the transformation of 
perceptions, thoughts, feelings into cognitively regulated pictorial 
elements which present the original events for "contemplation, logical 
intuition, recognition, understanding."17 In its efforts to call attention 
to the "formative-presentational" role of paintings as symbols, 
however, Langer's analysis dismisses too quickly the representational. 
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Just as a painting is able to "formulate" the primitive feelings and 
perceptions from which it arose, it also refers back to the same, thus 
exercising both presentational and referential properties of symbols. 
Paintings in many styles also refer outside themselves to persons, 
objects, or events which they are said to depict. Paintings or their 
shapes in both of these instances function representationally. Thus, we 
need not deny the relevance of representation to an analysis of 
paintings in their role as signs in order to see that a painting may do 
other things, such as formulate experience. The formulative and 
referential functions of paintings are not mutually exclusive.  
 
2. Presentational and Discursive Signs  
 
Langer's objections to the use of a linguistic model for analyzing 
painting arise largely from a proposed distinction between 
presentational and discursive signs. I understand this distinction to be 
a differentiation between the schemata of signs and symbols to which 
semiotic-linguistic concepts apply (discursive-lingistic signs) and 
schemata to which they do not apply (presentational-art symbol).18 It 
is interesting to note how Langer is led to the distinction between 
presentational and discursive schema. Her own account of this in 
Philosophy in a New Key suggests that the distinction arises out of a 
desire to free cognitive activity from a limit which follows from the 
post-Wittgensteinian, post-Carnapian analysis of language. The 
essence of this limit is that language, including mathematical and 
scientific signs, plus linguistic approximations in gesture, 
hieroglyphics, and graphs, is the only means of articulating thought. 
This is accompanied by the corollary that any aspect of experience 
which cannot be articulated in a discursive language (Langer's sense) 
is to be regarded as feelings. In accordance with this distinction, the 
structures in which feelings are objectified are treated as expressions 
of emotion, feeling, or wish.19  
 
Langer's desire to make a place in cognitive activity for other 
kinds of semiotic activity, especially that of works of art, prompts her 
sharp distinction between discursive schema and presentational 
schema. In the class of discursive schema she places language in the 
sense indicated above. In the class or presentational signs she 
includes works of art such as paintings. Her plan was to accept the 
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prescriptions of the post-Wittgensteinian, post-Carnapian analysis of 
language, but not to stop where it does. Langer sees in art symbols an 
unexplored area of semantic which goes beyond that already explored 
in connection with discursive languages. Previous analysis by Carnap 
and others has failed to comprehend the important distinction between 
simple cries of "oh" and the articulateness of symbols in the arts. She 
asserts that art symbols are genuine symbol forms but not those 
investigated previously by logicians.20  
 
Having argued for the extension of symbolic activity to include 
works of art, Langer then proceeds to distinguish art symbols from 
discursive language symbols. Consider her remarks concerning 
painting. Visual form lines, colors, and other pictorial elements are just 
as capable of becoming symbols as are words. However, languages as 
discursive sign systems are a special sort which preclude generalizing 
from them to paintings. The discursive features of language which 
separate it from paintings are then enumerated.  
 
1. Languages have vocabulary and syntax including word 
elements with fixed meanings which can be used in 
connection with rules of syntax to make composite symbols 
with new meanings.  
2. Word equivalencies in a language permit expression of the 
same meaning in various forms and also permit the 
construction of a dictionary.  
3. Language systems permit translation of propositions and 
substitution of words without changes in meaning.21  
 
In contrast to languages, pictures, including paintings, lack 
elements with independent meanings, and their shapes are arranged 
in "quite indescribable combinations." 22 Because paintings do not 
possess the salient characteristics of discursive signs enumerated 
above, Langer concludes that paintings are non-discursive. 
Structurally, this means that paintings do not have vocabulary or 
syntax. This structural distinction is in addition to the previously noted 
functional distinction in which Langer claims that signs in discursive 
systems may represent or denote but signs in painting schemes do 
not.  
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I am in full agreement with Langer's desire to recognize the 
status of works of art as forms of cognitive activity along with 
languages and other sign schemes. My chief quarrel with her arises 
from her radical separation of works of art from languages by means 
of the proposed distinction between presentational and discursive 
schema. My contention is that neither her arguments for this 
distinction nor a comparison of the two kinds of schemata, particularly 
cases of paintings and written languages, will support this strong 
distinction.  
 
3. Sequentially versus Simultaneously Perceivable 
Structures  
 
In order to support her distinction between presentational and 
discursive signs, Langer introduces the notion that discursive signs 
present their information in sequential order, while presentational 
signs offer theirs simultaneously. A possible interpretation of Langer's 
notion is the following: The viewer of the painting has the entire work 
in front of him and is able to read the signs in the painting 
simultaneously; however, the reader of the novel can only experience 
the written signs sequentially in a connected series which is regularly 
interrupted by the turning of pages. But a message in a written 
language need not be more than a page long to be of significance. 
Paragraphs or poems frequently do not exceed the length of a page; 
sentences almost never do. I presume, however, that Langer is 
making a more consequential claim, either about the way in which 
elements in a string of written words and elements of a paintings are 
arranged, or about the manner in which the respective orders are 
perceived. Possibly she intends to apply the sequential-simultaneous 
distinction to both. But I will argue that it applies to neither.  
 
I understand sequence as it applies to word inscriptions and to 
paintings to be the arrangement of visual-cognitive cues which 
establishes continuity for a perceiver among the parts of the string of 
words or among the elements of a painting. Sequential order is visual 
in the sense that it is presented in a medium that is capable of being 
perceived through the eyes. Sequential order is cognitive in the sense 
that it entails the arrangement of these elements in human behavioral 
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acts that are directed toward ordering the thought-experiences to 
which these elements are related.  
 
Applied to strings of phonemes or words which are "well 
formed" according to the rules of a language and which have meaning 
with respect to the semantic relations of the language, sequential as 
Langer uses it refers to the essentially one-dimensional arrangement 
of the string of words. In written English it is customary to place the 
words in a sequence from left to right on a surface. Thus far we have 
established a plausible interpretation of sequential as it applies to 
strings of words, the example of discursive signs.  
 
Does this definition of sequential order apply to the 
arrangement of shapes in paintings? In some styles there are 
approximations of sequential composition, e.g., Eugene Delacroix's 
The Arab Tax, Joseph Turner's Keelmen Heaving Coals by Moon Light, 
and Paul Cezanne's Mont Sainte-Victoire, 1904-6.23 In planning and 
executing a painting the artist, in many styles, carefully divides the 
canvas into areas of relatively proportioned size according to 
mathematically determined formulas. He then uses these divisions of 
the canvas to determine the basis for the distribution of color, value, 
and shapes.24 Division of the canvas in itself is not a sequential order, 
but it suggests a basis for one. It enables the artist to plan his 
composition so as to "lead the viewer's eye" through a sequence of 
important points in the painting based on the distribution of shapes.  
 
There are several means of developing sequential composition. 
Dominance and subordinance among shapes in a composition is one. A 
painter may indicate dominant shapes by size variation, brighter color, 
greater complexity of structure, etc. Systematic gradations in sizes of 
shapes may also act as a basis for sequential composition. Delacroix's 
use of bright colors for dominant shapes, together with gradations in 
shape sizes, sets up a kind of sequential order among the shapes in 
The Arab Tax, illustrating both of these principles. The use of a scaled 
palette on which the artist arranges the colors into orders based upon 
systematic gradation of hue, saturation, and brightness is another 
means of sequential composition. The artist follows the arrangement of 
pigment gradations on the set palette in order to "lead the eye" in 
accordance with the sequences of color gradation. Turner in Keelmen 
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Heaving Coals by Moon Light and Cezanne in Mont Sainte-Victorie, 
1904-6, reflecting the use of a scaled palette, establish a sense of 
sequential composition based on color gradation. Dominance and the 
other principles need not always result in sequential arrangement, but 
these examples suggest they may do so.25  
 
Before leaving the issue of sequential order we will consider the 
relevance of the sequential-simultaneous distinction to the perception 
of strings of words and paintings. Sequential perceiving I will define in 
terms of the evidence from studies of eye movements.26 I will regard 
as symptomatic of sequentially initiated perception eye movements 
that follow, element by element, the order set forth in the 
arrangement of a string of words or a painting. Similarly, I will regard 
as symptomatic of simultaneously initiated perception a situation in 
which all the elements of the visible string of words or all of the 
elements of the painting are grasped at the same time.  
 
Studies of eye movements of subjects reading or viewing 
paintings do not confirm either strictly sequential movements of the 
eye in reading words or all-encompassing "eye-gulps" in viewing 
paintings. Buswell's study of how people view paintings, which is 
based on photographing and charting eye movements of subjects 
looking at paintings, reports some interesting information pertinent to 
the sequence-simultaneous distinction. Buswell reports, "in looking at 
pictures just as in the process of reading, the eye moves in a series of 
quick jerks and pauses." 27 He notes that the directions of eye 
movements in viewing a painting do not follow the general pattern of 
the design by moving from motif to motif. There is evidence, however, 
for two general patterns in eye movements:  
 
One of these consists of a general survey in which the eye 
moves with a series of relatively short pauses over the main 
portions of the picture. A second type of pattern was observed 
in which series of fixations, usually longer in duration, are 
concentrated over small areas of the picture, evidencing detailed 
examination of those sections.28  
 
If we may assume that eye movements are objective symptoms of the 
perceptual processes, as Buswell does, then Langer's distinction 
between discursive and presentation signs is not supported. Neither of 
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these reported patterns of eye movements during the viewing of 
paintings suggests anything like simultaneous apprehension of the 
information in the painting. The evidence points instead to a much 
closer similarity of pattern between the eye movements observed in 
reading and in viewing paintings than expected.  
 
E. H. Gombrich comes to a similar conclusion concerning the 
inadequacy of the sequence simultaneous distinction in perceiving 
written words and paintings. Gombrich writes:  
 
We believe that we take the picture more or less at one glance 
and recognize the motif. Our experience with Escher's 
contradition shows that this account is inadequate. We read a 
picture as we read a printed line, by picking up letters or cues 
and fitting them together.29  
 
It is thus conceivable that eye movements in both activities follow 
centers of interest and organize information by linking together the 
various centers of interest into a coherent view. In paintings the areas 
of interest consist of concentrations of lines, special color areas, and 
shapes. In prose writing corresponding area of interest are key words 
spread over the page.  
 
Therefore, the argument that languages present information 
sequentially and that paintings present information simultaneously is 
contradicted by evidence that both may have similar methods for the 
arrangement and the perception of their elements.  
 
4. The Argument That Paintings Lack Vocabulary  
 
Returning now to Langer's proposed structural distinctions 
between discursive and presentational symbolic systems, let us 
consider her argument that paintings lack vocabulary. The first task is 
to clarify what is meant by vocabulary. Langer's explanation of 
linguistic vocabulary shows it consisting of a stock of words with fixed 
meanings, which have equivalents from which a dictionary of 
meanings may be composed. Also, the vocabulary elements in a 
language may be equivalent to other single units or combinations of 
elements into which they are translatable. Paintings, it is argued, do 
not possess vocabulary because they cannot be broken down into 
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elements like words. Lines, areas of light and shade, color patches "do 
not represent, item for item, those elements which have names; there 
is not one blotch for the nose, one for the mouth, etc." 30  
 
One difficulty I find with Langer's comparison of vocabulary in 
language and in painting is that nowhere is it established what should 
be the units of comparison. Shall we compare words with lines, areas 
of light and shade, color patches? Or shall we compare letter 
characters with lines and color patches and leave completed words for 
comparison with completed paintings? Langer does not clearly 
delineate the appropriate units of comparison. She seems to assume 
that the question of vocabulary is to be settled by comparing the 
function of words with that of lines, areas of light and shade, and color 
patches. Perhaps this formulation prejudices the case too heavily 
against the possibility of paintings having vocabulary.  
 
The arguments offered by Langer to show that the vocabulary 
elements of languages have fixed meanings, that some words are 
equivalent to combinations of other words, and that the elements of 
one system can be translated into those of other systems are not 
conclusive reasons for accepting the conclusion that paintings do not 
have vocabulary.31 It has not been shown on their behalf that 
analogous operations are impossible with respect to paintings. The 
vocabulary elements in a language have fixed meanings, if at all, only 
with respect to their membership in a sign scheme in which they are 
assigned certain meanings. A dictionary will show that the same term 
is usually assigned a range of meanings rather than a fixed meaning 
and that the same word may be assigned quite different meanings. 
Thus, if Langer's argument is that elements in paintings differ because 
they do not have fixed meanings, etc., her argument could as easily be 
applied to written verbal languages.  
 
More important, it is not necessary that elements in painting 
parallel in every way linguistic elements in order to say that paintings 
may have vocabulary. Styles of painting are an alternative kind of 
symbolic system with their own sense of vocabulary. This essay 
suggests that phonemes, morphemes, and words are the vocabulary 
elements in languages and that in styles of painting shapes are the 
basic vocabulary elements. Are there, then, important analogies 
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between vocabulary in language and in painting? There are two 
important parallels. First, elements in both are used in combination 
with other similar elements to form more complex "units of meaning." 
Phonomes, morphemes, and words combine into sentences, 
paragraphs, poems, etc. By analogy, shapes combine into whole 
paintings or integrated sections of them. Second, a selection of both 
elements, linguistic elements and shapes, are used as representational 
vehicles in their respective schemes.  
 
Alternative to Langer's view that painting has no vocabulary, I 
have proposed that styles of painting have dominant vocabularies of 
shapes. Elsewhere, a detailed analysis of vocabularies of shapes in 
terms of three-shape types-motif, theme, and plastic-is presented.32 
Motif shapes are configurations of pictorial elements identified with our 
visual experiences of objects or events more or less familiar from 
every day experiences. Geometric shapes and shapes associated with 
human figures, buildings, trees, animal figures, etc., are examples of 
motif shapes. Theme shapes are motif shapes which have the 
additional feature of being associated with classical, biblical, or 
historical myths, characters, and stories. When a shape is associated 
with a theme, the shape carries with it the additional meaning 
attached to the theme in its literary or historical setting. For example, 
the human figure shapes in Da Vinci's The Last Supper do not merely 
depict a group of men sitting at a table. Rather, these shapes are 
understood by an informed viewer in relation to the biblical "last 
supper" narrative. Plastic shapes are the vocabularies in "abstract 
styles." Because they refer to abstract metaphysical notions, emotional 
states, or unfamiliar nature phenomena, plastic shapes are not seen as 
representational shapes in the sense of motif and theme shapes. They 
are used by painters such as Mondrian and Rothko to represent 
metaphysical realities and emotional states for which familiar visual 
associations are not readily available.33  
 
The three-shape categories share with words two proposed 
features of vocabulary: the shapes combine into more complex units in 
their respective systems. Also, they refer both generally-as when they 
depict metaphysical notions and emotional states shared by many 
persons or when they designate a human being but no single person-
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 32, No. 3 (Spring 1974): pg. 331-342. DOI. This article is © Wiley and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
17 
 
and specifically-as when a painting depicts a particular building or 
person.  
 
5. The Argument That Paintings Lack Syntax  
 
Finally, I examine Langer's claim that paintings lack syntax. 
Langer holds, and I agree, that syntax provides the rules in a sign 
system for combining formal elements into composite units.34 The 
more complete statement of her arguments against syntax of painting 
occurs in her book, Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. In Mind, the 
essence of her objection to the use of syntax to speak of paintings is: 
whereas the rules for combining elements in languages are "few 
enough to be formally known as rules of syntax," the rules of painting 
are not so few;35 whereas conventions change less frequently in word 
usage, they change with greater frequency in painting; whereas the 
conventions are more binding in word usage, they are less so in 
painting; and whereas the manipulation of elements in a language 
according to syntactic rules will produce a sentence, etc., the 
manipulation of the elements of painting by rules will not result in a 
work of art.36  
 
None of these arguments offer serious substance to Langer's 
contention that paintings lack syntax altogether. Her reasons for 
denying syntax to painting make the criteria for deciding whether or 
not a given schema has a syntax a matter of the degree to which it 
possesses the stated properties. The absurdity of this becomes 
apparent when we see what follows from it. If the criteria are as 
Langer's view implies, the following questions are entitled to an 
answer. How few rules must a schema have to be syntactic? How 
much change in the conventions is permitted? How binding shall be 
the conventions? To answer these questions requires both means for 
measuring and norms for determining whether a given schema 
qualifies, and these are not provided. It hardly seems fair to 
presuppose, as Langer must, that written language, which is only one 
kind of sign schema, should be taken as the norm.  
 
This is not the only objection to Langer's arguments. 
Particularly, the first three arguments commit the same kind of error 
that appears in her discussion of vocabulary: failure to establish 
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corresponding units of comparison between the schema of language 
and of paintings. If we are comparing the syntactic rules of "all 
paintings" with those of "a single language," then of course, the rules 
for painting will be greater in number, the conventions will appear to 
change more frequently, and the conventions will appear to be less 
binding. This is because the comparison of an hypothetical schema 
encompassing all of the schemata of painting with the schema of a 
single language does not compare units of the same magnitude. 
Without the determination of appropriate schemata for comparison, 
Langer's discussion turns out to be relatively inconsequential in the 
determination of whether or not paintings can be said to have syntax.  
 
Langer's final argument offered against the possibility of syntax 
for paintings is that manipulation of line, color, and the other pictorial 
elements by rules will not produce "a work of art." This argument begs 
the question. For the issue of syntax or none in paintings is not 
whether the manipulation of lines and colors according to rule will 
produce "a work of art." Rather it is, will the manipulation of these 
elements according to rules be a dominant factor in producing a 
painting in a certain style? As they are analyzed in this essay, rules of 
style are indeed useful in making or analyzing a painting. 
 
Alternative to Langer, I contend grammar-like rules of styles in 
important respects analogous to syntactic rules of language. Both 
determine formal arrangements of elements in the structures of their 
respective units. Also, both provide criteria for distinguishing 
acceptable from non-acceptable units of their systems. For example, 
the expression "He worded the sentence incorrectly" is accepted as a 
syntactically correct sentence. However, when judged by the rules of 
English syntax, the expression "The incorrectly he sentence worded," 
using the same string of words, is syntactically incorrect. By analogy, 
stylistic rules distinguish acceptable arrangements of shapes in the 
works of a style. A comparison of Piero della Francesca's The 
Flagellation and Hogarth's Satire on False Perspective with respect to 
the rules of artificial linear perspective as used in Piero's style 
illustrates how a painting may satisfy or violate the syntactic rules of a 
style.37  
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The syntactic rules for styles of painting differ in important 
respects from both rules of logical syntax and syntactic rules of 
grammar. Syntactic rules in logical systems describe proper sequences 
of predicates, etc., and prescribe appropriate transformations, 
substitutions, and deductions. Syntactic rules of ordinary languages 
(English, French, etc.) characterize such arrangements as appropriate 
sequences of subject-object-verb order. The rules of syntax in a style 
of painting are based on stylistic practices for arranging shapes. Two 
dominant factors in the structural arrangement of shapes in a 
composition are color and linear spatial relations. Accordingly, the 
rules of color arrangement and of linear spatial arrangement are two 
dominant kinds of syntactic rules. Examples of color rules are: the use 
of color zones (light, middle, dark) to order shapes in certain 
Florentine paintings, the system of short daubs of energized color 
characteristics of Impressionist paintings, and the juxtaposition of 
"pure color shapes" against pure color shapes in Fauvist style. 
Examples of different stylistic rules based on linear spatial 
arrangement are found in the rules of artificial linear perspective use in 
Piero's Renaissance style, the use of the "serpentive line" principle in 
Mannerist style, and the principle of standardized units used in the 
works of the painter Lohse.38 The rules of syntax cited in these 
examples describe or prescribe in part the compositional arrangement 
of shape elements in a style.  
 
In conclusion, Hofstadter limits unjustifiably the sense of 
referential meaning by arguing that it does not include, or is 
incompatible with, other kinds of meaning. Langer errs in excluding 
any referential function from the formative role of paintings. Her 
contention that paintings belong to presentational rather than to 
discursive schemata is ambiguous and is incongruous with studies 
related to eye movement. By failing to specify appropriate criteria of 
comparison, by limitation of such terms as vocabulary and work of art, 
and by vague qualifications for syntax, Langer fails to render adequate 
support to her contention that paintings lack vocabulary and syntax. 
Consequently, Hofstadter's and Langer's arguments fail to show either 
that schemata of paintings lack the features of semiotic schemes or 
that referential (representational) meaning and function are 
inappropriately applied to paintings. Finally, I conclude on the basis of 
the proposals offered here that the notions of syntax and semantic find 
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a place in the analysis of styles of painting which is both loosely 
analogous to their use as applied to language and also distinct.39  
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